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Abstract—Assertions are widely used for functional validation
as well as coverage analysis for both software and hardware
designs. Assertions enable runtime error detection as well as
faster localization of errors. While there is a vast literature on
both software and hardware assertions for monitoring functional
scenarios, there is limited effort in utilizing assertions to monitor
System-on-Chip (SoC) security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we
identify common SoC security vulnerabilities by analyzing the
design. To monitor these vulnerabilities, we define several classes
of assertions to enable runtime checking of security vulnera-
bilities. Our experimental results demonstrate that the security
assertions generated by our proposed approach can detect all the
inserted vulnerabilities while the functional assertions generated
by state-of-the-art assertion generation techniques fail to detect
most of them.
I. INTRODUCTION
System-on-Chip (SoC) security is critical as more and more
personal computing needs as well as physical infrastructures
are controlled by a chip with the prevalence of Internet-of-
Things (IoTs). Attackers take advantage of security vulnera-
bilities to inject malicious software. Tools such as anti-virus
are not enough to protect from these attacks. Security vulner-
abilities can arise in any stage, from design to fabrication, as
well as post deployment. In contrast to a software vulnerability
which can be modified after deployment, fixing a hardware
vulnerability becomes more and more difficult and expensive
in later stages. Existing approaches try to mask some of the
vulnerabilities using firmware patching or utilizing in-built
reconfigurable primitives. However, these approaches may
not work in all scenarios. Therefore, detecting and removing
vulnerabilities in early stages is very important in SoC designs.
Assertion-Based Verification (ABV) is a common prac-
tice in industry today for functional validation of System-
on-Chip (SoC) designs [1]. Assertions define the properties
that should hold. For example, a functional assertion can
check that the output of an adder is equal to the sum of
two inputs irrespective of the implementation. In addition to
checking the inputs and outputs, assertions can also increase
the observability of internal states, which enables runtime error
detection as well as faster localization of errors. While there
is a vast literature on both software and hardware assertions
for monitoring functional scenarios, there is limited effort in
utilizing assertions to monitor SoC security vulnerabilities [2].
Existing SoC validation techniques mainly focus on the
functional behaviors defined in the specification. Traditionally,
SoC security vulnerabilities are not considered as expected
functional behaviors. For example, an unspecified transition
in finite state machine (FSM) is one of the main sources of
Fig. 1: Our proposed framework consists of two main steps.
First, we perform vulnerability analysis on a given SoC to
identify potential vulnerabilities. Next, assertions are generated
based on the vulnerabilities and inserted into the design.
security vulnerabilities. While ABV is the de facto standard
for functional validation, there are limited prior efforts to
define and monitor SoC security vulnerabilities. Given the
importance of SoC security, we propose a framework for
defining and utilizing SoC security assertions as shown in
Figure 1. The framework consists of two main steps. First,
we perform vulnerability analysis on a given SoC design and
identify potential vulnerabilities. Next, security assertions are
generated from the vulnerabilities and inserted into the SoC
design. The purpose of this paper is not to provide a laundry
list of vulnerabilities for SoC designs. Instead, we identify
some representative vulnerabilities and propose assertions for
them to show how SoC security assertions can be defined
and integrated in an existing SoC validation methodology.
Specifically, this paper makes three major contributions:
1) We perform a comprehensive review of the literature to
identify the common SoC security vulnerabilities.
2) We propose security assertions corresponding to each
vulnerability. We plan to upload the security assertions
for various open source SoCs in TrustHub [3].
3) We demonstrate that existing assertion-based valida-
tion is not capable of detecting security vulnerabili-
ties. Therefore, security assertions defined in this paper
should be part of any security validation methodology.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Sec-
tion II surveys related approaches. Section III provides an
overview of SoC security vulnerabilities. Section IV describes
the framework for assertion generation for a given set of
security vulnerabilities. Section V presents six case studies.
Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
There are significant prior efforts in classifying software-
level vulnerabilities [4], [5]. While there are related works
in specific areas (e.g., classifying hardware Trojans), to the
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best of our knowledge, there are limited previous works on
developing a comprehensive classification of potential SoC
vulnerabilities. Similarly, there are various efforts on func-
tional assertions in the context of assertion-based validation.
However, there are limited prior efforts in defining and uti-
lizing SoC security assertions. In this section, we present
the related works in assertion-based validation as well as
automated generation of assertions.
A. Assertion-based Validation
There are mainly two types of approaches for defining
hardware assertions: language-based and library-based [6].
Language-based approaches provides syntax for formally
defining assertions. Two of the most popular assertion speci-
fication languages are Property Specification Language (PSL)
[7] and System Verilog Assertions (SVA) [8]. Both of these
languages support temporal assertions and formally is an
extension of temporal logic [9]. Some other examples are For-
Spec [10], SALT [11], a SystemC extension [12], etc. On the
other hand, library-based approaches adds assertion support
to existing languages. One such example is Open Verification
Library (OVL) [13]. OVL has support for Verilog, VHDL, PSL
and SystemVerilog. Library-based approaches can be used to
quickly write common types of assertions. Unfortunately, they
are not generic enough to cover all possible scenarios. In this
paper, we use SVA to express our SoC security assertions.
B. Automated Assertion Generation
Assertion generation is mostly manual effort - it is time-
consuming to insert enough assertions into an industrial SoC
design. Many research efforts have been devoted to automated
generation of functional assertions. Rogin et al. [14] proposed
to generate properties of a design by analyzing simulation
traces. Hertz et al. [15] improved the analysis process using
data mining and developed a tool named Goldmine. The
generated rules from simulation traces are passed through a
formal verification tool to verify the correctness in the design.
As the simulation data is inherently incomplete and nondeter-
ministic, the quality of mined assertions cannot be guaranteed.
Moreover, as our case studies show, these functional assertions
are not suitable for detecting security vulnerabilities.
III. SOC SECURITY VULNERABILITIES
While there is a vast literature on both software and
hardware assertions for monitoring functional scenarios, there
are limited efforts to define and utilize assertions to monitor
System-on-Chip (SoC) security vulnerabilities [2], [16]. We
reviewed a wide variety of security vulnerabilities listed in the
National Vulnerability Database [5] and related research [2],
and identified common SoC security vulnerabilities that are
related to SoCs. Note that there is a fundamental difference be-
tween exceptions and security vulnerabilities. The exceptions
are defined today by SoC designers based on the point of view
of functional correctness, whereas the security vulnerabilities
outlined in this proposal are solely from security and trust
perspectives. For example, an adversary may trigger (e.g.,
using a Trojan) an exception (e.g., divide by zero) solely
to gain a higher privilege level, such that private memory
or registers can be accessed. The remainder of this section
describes our proposed seven vulnerability classes.
A. Permissions and Privileges
Permissions and privileges are the main components of the
access control subsystem. Specifically, different resources are
controlled by different permissions and privileges. For exam-
ple, in ARM7 processor, seven different modes are defined,
such as user mode, interrupt mode, and supervisor mode.
It is critical to check whether the conditions for triggering
privileged modes are satisfied before changing modes.
B. Resource Management
Certain resources should be protected against any illegal ac-
cess, including accessing special hardware from non-privileged
modes, misuse of design-for-debug infrastructures during nor-
mal usage, and so on. For example, JTAG allows engineers to
trace secure memory during post-silicon validation and debug
of security features. However, JTAG should never be enabled
during normal usage.
C. Illegal States and Transitions
The behavior of an SoC can be modeled as a finite state
machine (FSM). The valid states or transitions can be verified
during functional validation. Attackers are more interested in
the backdoor that allows undefined states/transitions. To verify
the existence of illegal states and transitions, we could use
assertions of valid states and transitions to alarm any violation,
or enumerate all possible invalid states and transitions to
prevent specific vulnerabilities.
D. Buffer Issues
Modern SoCs consist of advanced features (e.g., out-of-
order execution and speculative execution) as well as a large
number of heterogeneous buffers. Similar to software buffer
errors, these buffers in deeper pipelines require significant
validation efforts to detect any remaining flaws. For example,
prefetched instructions in buffers should be flushed if the
branch prediction is incorrect. Otherwise, these flaws can be
exploited to mount an attack.
E. Information Leakage
Modern SoCs try to isolate a secure world from a non-secure
world. Information from the secure world should never be
leaked to non-secure world directly. ARM uses TrustZone as
an approach to provide the secure world [17]. There should be
safeguards present to prevent non-secure world from accessing
TrustZone directly.
F. Numeric Exceptions
Numeric exceptions represent the erroneous/illegal behav-
iors (e.g., divide by zero) during arithmetic computations.
Even if the program does not lead to illegal numeric compu-
tation, an attacker can make it happen, and utilize it to create
a vulnerability.
G. Malicious Implants
In software community, code injection means allowing
attackers to run arbitrary code. Similarly, hardware Trojans,
inserted by untrusted third party, allow attackers to execute an
arbitrary path after applying specific input patterns. This can
lead to information leakage or other unintended consequences.
Trojans are usually inserted in hard-to-detect and rare-to-
activate areas, making it hard to detect them during validation.
Fig. 2: Overview of our proposed assertion generation frame-
work for the seven classes of SoC vulnerabilities.
IV. SOC SECURITY ASSERTIONS
This section mainly addresses two important questions: i)
how to generate the security assertions, and ii) how to embed
them in the SoC design (RTL models).
A. Embedding of Security Assertions
There are two orthogonal ways of embedding assertions in
the RTL model of an SoC design: immediate and concurrent
assertions. Please note that immediate assertions can be con-
verted to concurrent assertions by modifying the antecedent.
However, as described below, it would be natural to use a
specific one depending on the type of security vulnerability.
Immediate Assertions: Immediate assertions are powerful in
detecting vulnerabilities such as numeric errors. Immediate
assertions are flexible and can vary based on the potential state-
ments or blocks. For immediate operations, it is important to
find out the exact location, the relevant variable (e.g., trigger)
α, and the assertion, assert (P (α)), can be inserted. Immediate
assertions are inherent for checking specific operations, such
as divide-by-zero checking and out-of-boundary checking.
Concurrent Assertions: Concurrent assertions, on the other
hand, are checked each clock cycle, representing expected
properties of SoCs. Concurrent assertions are useful to ex-
press any FSM related vulnerabilities (e.g., illegal states and
transitions). Each concurrent assertion can be defined using
assert property (P ). The property P should be derived from
the specification of SoCs and vulnerability classes.
B. Generation of Security Assertions
We use static (code) analysis to generate security assertions
to detect the existence of the vulnerabilities outlined in Sec-
tion III, as shown in Figure 2. In this section, we briefly outline
the assertion generation for each vulnerability class.
Permissions and Privileges: By analyzing the specification,
we need to figure out the variable that represents the privilege
level, e.g., CPSR in ARMv7. For each entry to a privileged
operation block, we need to generate an assertion. For the ease
of illustration, we use user to represent current privilege, and
admin to represent root privilege. For each possible entry
into the privileged operation block, we need to generate the
immediate assertion as: assert(user == admin).
Resource Management: Concurrent assertions are powerful in
protecting resources from misuse in an unexpected way. For
example, to protect JTAG from getting used during normal
operation mode, we need to generate the assertion as: assert
property (normal |− > !JTAG_enable).
Illegal States and Transitions: The behaviors of modules as
well as their interactions (protocols) can be expressed in FSMs.
Therefore, we can express both valid and invalid (illegal)
transitions as security assertions. For example, if there is a
valid transition from state A to state B when variable a
is true, it can be encoded as an assertion: assert property
(A && a |− > B). Similarly, the assertion, assert property
(!(C|− > A)) can be used to ensure that no transitions are
allowed from state C to state A.
Buffer Issues: Assertions can be generated for all boundary
cases related to buffers. To prevent access of the buffer index
beyond its limits, immediate assertions should be added before
each buffer access. Before accessing Buffer[index], the
variable index needs to satisfy assert (index >= 0 &&
index <= limit). In many scenarios, we may require
concurrent assertions to ensure global interactions. For exam-
ple, to ensure the flush of instruction buffer (IB) after branch
prediction failure, we can use the assertion assert property
(Pre_fail |− > IB_Empty).
Information Leakage: To protect secret information from di-
rectly leaking to non-secure world, tagging is one potential
solution. It assumes that the results of secure world can
only be passed to non-secure world through special interface
(privileged instructions). For each normal operation consisting
of both secure and non-secure variables, we need to check if
the result is assigned to a non-secure variable as expected. If s
is a secure variable, the assignment of s to a variable v needs
to check the tag of v as assert(v t == secure tag).
Numeric Exceptions: Numeric exceptions are more relevant
to the implementation of SoC designs. We need to generate
one assertion for each possible numeric exception during
arithmetic computation. For example, in case of a divide-by-
zero exception, we can generate an immediate assertion as:
assert(divisor != 0).
Malicious Implants: Malicious modifications (e.g., hardware
Trojans) can be inserted during pre-silicon or post-silicon
stage. In the pre-silicon stage, hardware Trojans are usually
hidden in rare-to-activate branches or rare execution of con-
current statements. For example, we can generate assertions for
each rare branch by adding an assertion for each rare trigger
condition as: assert(rare trigger).
The security assertions are generated based on the vulnera-
bilities outlined in Section III. More assertions can be added
based on designer inputs or application-specific considerations.
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Fig. 3: Comparison of our assertions and assertions generated
by Goldmine [15] in detecting security vulnerabilities.
V. CASE STUDY
To demonstrate the necessity of security assertions, we
analyzed six benchmarks and inserted security assertions in-
troduced in Section IV. Then, Goldmine [15] was applied on
all the benchmarks to generate as many assertions as possible.
To evaluate the effectiveness of our security assertions, we
randomly inserted 10 vulnerabilities into the design to form 10
vulnerable instances and applied directed test to activate these
vulnerabilities. If any assertion generated by the two methods
(ours versus Goldmine) got activated during simulation, we
claim the corresponding method detects the vulnerability.
The types of potential vulnerabilities of each benchmark and
the detected instances are shown in Table I and Figure 3,
respectively. Note that the number of instances are more
than the number of vulnerability types, as each type may
contain multiple instances. In the remainder of this section,
we describe each type of vulnerability and inserted instances
in detail. Overall, our approach is able to detect all of the
vulnerabilities while the assertions generated by Goldmine fail
to detect most of them.
Vulnerability Arbiter PCI USB MEM GNG AES
Permissions and
Privileges
X
Resource
Management
X X
Illegal States &
Transitions
X X X
Buffer Issues X
Information
Leakage
X
Numeric Excep-
tions
X
Malicious
Implants
X
TABLE I: Types of vulnerabilities explored in the six bench-
marks (more potential vulnerabilities are possible).
A. Arbiter
We first analyzed a simple design, Arbiter, as shown in
Figure 4. For this simple design, we inserted the vulnerability
of invalid states and transitions. Even for this small design,
careless design, fault injections, or transient errors can make it
behave differently. For example, if the security of whole design
relies on the gnt1 and gnt2 not asserted together, assert(!(gnt1
req1
gnt1
rst
gnt2
state
0
req2
Fig. 4: A simple arbiter with four inputs (req1, req2, rst, clk
(not shown)) and two outputs (gnt1, gnt2).
& gnt2)) should be added to the design. However, the number
of invalid states and transitions would be exponential when
time is involved. For example, when we consider two consec-
utive cycles, assert(!(gnt1 | => (gnt2 != req2))) should hold.
We limit the number of assertions to 10 in this example.
The assertions generated by Goldmine are shown in List-
ing 1. As Goldmine analyzes the golden design by mining the
traces of random simulation, it is able to capture reachable
states and transitions by the specific simulation.
Listing 1: Assertions of Arbiter by Goldmine
( s t a t e == 1 & req2 == 1) |−> ( gn t1 == 0)
( r eq1 == 1 & s t a t e == 0) |−> ( gn t1 == 1)
( r eq1 == 0) |−> ( gn t1 == 0)
( r eq1 == 1 & req2 == 0) |−> ( gn t1 == 1)
( r eq1 == 1 & s t a t e == 0) |−> ( gn t2 == 0)
( r eq2 == 1 & s t a t e == 1) |−> ( gn t2 == 1)
( r eq2 == 0) |−> ( gn t2 == 0)
( r eq2 == 1 & req1 == 0) |−> ( gn t2 == 1)
The 10 vulnerability instances are generated by mimicking the
behavior of fault injection, i.e., randomly inverting one signal
in Figure 4. As we can see from Figure 3, Goldmine is good
at detecting vulnerabilities involving finite state machines in
this small design.
B. PCI
Top module pci master32 sm from Opencores [18] contains
eight modules such as pci frame crit and pci irdy out crit.
To mimic SoC design, which contains different parts from un-
trusted third party, we inserted invalid states and transitions
to the subordinate modules (8 out of 10) as well as the top
modules (2 out of 10). Goldmine generated 19 assertions. To
generate vulnerable instances, we randomly changed operators
in all the modules. As shown in Figure 3, Goldmine was
able to capture the two vulnerabilities, but failed to detect
the remaining eight vulnerabilities.
C. USB Protocol
USB protocol defines the packet fields and its corresponding
operations. We analyzed the USB protocol module usbf pa.v
along with CRC module from Opencores [18] and identified
two types of vulnerabilities. The USB protocol depends on
the packet ID (PID) to identify the types of packets including
token, data, handshake, and special. For each type of packets,
PIDs will not overlap. In the module, the output of PID is
stored in tx data whose value depends on the input selectors.
The two types of vulnerabilities are shown below:
1) Resource management: As the PIDs define the re-
sources of USB, it is critical to make sure that each
type of packet gets expected PID. For example, a token
packet should not get any of the PIDs belonging to data
packets, such as DATA0, DATA1. Similarly, a handshake
packet should stick to its own type, e.g., ACK, NAK.
We inserted 8 assertions of this type.
2) Invalid states and transitions: We inserted one
vulnerability in CRC module and one vulnerability in
the top module. As this is a common vulnerability in
almost every design, we will skip inserting this type of
vulnerability in the remaining benchmarks.
The vulnerable instances were generated accordingly. As
shown in Figure 3, while Goldmine can only detect one
vulnerability from state transition in top module, our assertions
can detect all of them.
D. A Simplified Memory Design
This design is created to mimic the behavior of a simplified
Trusted Hardware (TH) implementation of memory, as shown
in Listing 2. Trusted Hardware, e.g., Intels Software Guard
Extensions (SGX) [19], allows remote clients to upload private
computation and data to a secure container of a server with
a TH. One key implementation of SGX is the introduction
of Process Reserved Memory and Enclave Page Cache (EPC),
inhibiting invalid accesses even from the kernel. The simplified
design is shown in Listing 2 which contains input signal sc
to denote whether it is a secure access or not. The memory
space is denoted by an array named mem with size of 1MB.
1) Permissions and privileges. Assume the lower 1kB
of memory is allocated to EPC. Since EPC should be
accessed through secure container/process, each access
to the lower 1kB should be checked. Although one
conditional checking is already in place, assertions may
also help when implementation error, fault injection or
Hardware Trojans exist, e.g., assert(address <= 1024
| => sc) can be inserted before any access to memory.
2) Information leakage. In this simplified memory imple-
mentation, it does not explicitly describe the state of out
signal when we want to write. For a buggy CPU design
which connects to this memory, a process may be able
to read the previous access of another process from the
out port (including secure processes) with interleaved
memory access. We may add a concurrent assertion with
(assert property (wr | => out == 0)).
3) Buffer errors. Memory as one type of buffer should
be checked for buffer errors. Each access to memory
should be checked with assertions to test if address is in
the range of memory size. In this example, the memory
size is 1MB (220) and the length of address is 32 bits. We
need assert(address < 2∗∗20) to check out-of-boundary
accesses.
Listing 2: Simplified Memory of Trusted Hardware
module mem( c lk , r s t , wr , sc , a d d r e s s ,
in , o u t ) ;
input c lk , r s t , wr , s c ;
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] a d d r e s s ;
input [ 7 : 0 ] i n ;
output reg [ 7 : 0 ] o u t ;
reg [ 7 : 0 ] mem[2**20−1 :0 ] ;
always @ ( posedge c l k )
i f ( a d d r e s s >= 1024 | | sc ) begin
i f ( wr ) mem[ a d d r e s s ] <= i n ;
e l s e o u t <= mem[ a d d r e s s ] ;
end
endmodule
We inserted a vulnerability related to permissions and
privileges, by removing sc checking in the first if statement.
For vulnerabilities related to information leakage, we assume
that attackers are able to connect one specific location to out
when it is a write operation. Experimental results show that
Goldmine failed to detect any of these vulnerabilities while
our approach can detect all of them.
Listing 3: GNG interp
module g n g i n t e r p (
input c lk , r s t n , v a l i d i n ,
input [ 6 3 : 0 ] d a t a i n ,
output reg v a l i d o u t ,
output reg [ 1 5 : 0 ] d a t a o u t
) ;
wire [ 3 3 : 0 ] mul1 ;
wire s ig ned [ 1 3 : 0 ] mul1 new ;
reg [ 1 7 : 0 ] c0 r5 ;
reg s ign ed [ 1 8 : 0 ] sum2 ;
reg [ 1 4 : 0 ] sum2 rnd ;
a s s i g n mul1 new = mul1 [ 3 2 : 1 9 ] ;
always @ ( posedge c l k )
sum2 <= $ s i g n e d ({1 ’ b0 , c0 r5 } ) + mul1 new ;
always @ ( posedge c l k )
sum2 rnd <= sum2 [ 1 7 : 3 ] + sum2 [ 2 ] ;
. . .
endmodule
E. Gaussian Noise Generator (GNG)
We next inspected a computation-intensive design called
Gaussian Noise Generator (GNG). The design is downloaded
from Opencores [18]. One possible numeric error in this
design is the assignments between signed and unsigned values
as shown in the snippet of code in Listing 3. The first
assignment assigns an unsigned variable to a signed variable.
Next assignment is the computation between signed values.
The final assignment assigns a signed value to an unsigned
value. We are concerned with the automatic transformation
between signed and unsigned values. For example, when the
32th bit of mul1 is 1, mul1 new is interpreted as a negative
value using a two’s complement representation. Then mul new
is added to a positive number and converted to an unsigned
number again. The behavior may or may not be the original
intention of this code. We want to generate assertions, e.g.,
assert(mul1[32] != 1), and guide the test plan of debug. The
developer should decide if it is a numeric error or the expected
behavior. Since we view this design as “buggy” by itself, we
did not generate vulnerable instances for it. Rather, we use 10
direct tests to force mul1[32] to become 1 and check if the
assertions by Goldmine can catch the potential vulnerability.
As shown in Figure 3, Goldmine failed to detect any of them
since it only analyzes the traces of random simulation but
never inspects the specification/implementation.
Listing 4: AES table
module S4 ( c lk , JTAG , in , out , JTAG out ) ;
input c lk , JTAG ;
input [ 3 1 : 0 ] i n ;
output [ 3 1 : 0 ] o u t ;
output reg [ 3 1 : 0 ] JTAG out ;
S
S 0 ( c lk , i n [ 3 1 : 2 4 ] , o u t [ 3 1 : 2 4 ] ) ,
S 1 ( c lk , i n [ 2 3 : 1 6 ] , o u t [ 2 3 : 1 6 ] ) ,
S 2 ( c lk , i n [ 1 5 : 8 ] , o u t [ 1 5 : 8 ] ) ,
S 3 ( c lk , i n [ 7 : 0 ] , o u t [ 7 : 0 ] ) ;
always @ ( posedge c l k )
i f ( JTAG) JTAG out <= i n ;
endmodule
module S ( c lk , in , o u t ) ;
always @ ( posedge c l k )
case ( i n )
8 ’ h00 : o u t <= 8 ’ h63 ;
8 ’ h01 : o u t <= 8 ’ h7c ;
. . .
endcase
endmodule
F. AES
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a very commonly
used crypto core, consisting of ten rounds of block ciphers
(substitution permutation networks). The substitution is shown
in Listing 4. We also inserted JTAG to dump internal variables
during debug. The identified vulnerabilities are:
1) Resource management: As JTAG is for debug purpose
only, it should be disabled during normal usage. As a
result, the dump signal should contains nothing related to
any internal signals. We inserted an concurrent assertion
assert property (!JTAG |-> (JTAG_out == 0))
to prevent attackers from bypassing the JTAG checking
and dump internal signals to infer the plaintext.
2) Malicious implants: As module S contains a lot
of rare branches, attackers are able to construct rare
trigger conditions for hardware Trojans. For example,
the probability of (out == 32’h7c7c7c7c) is 2−32 when
(in == 8’h01) is true for all S 0, S 1, S 2 and S 3
together. Assertions like assert(out != 32’h7c7c7c7c) in
module S4 can guide the designer of a test plan to
cover this specific potential trigger condition. As the
combinations of rare branches are potentially infinite,
we restricted the number of assertions to be 10.
One of our vulnerable instances is a design bypassing JTAG
checking directly. For the other 9 instances, we construct
random hardware Trojans from the rare branches. As shown
in Figure 3, our approach is able to detect the vulnerabilities.
Goldmine cannot detect any of them.
Overall, the security assertions generated by our approach
are able to detect all the security vulnerabilities whereas the
assertions generated by state-of-the-art technique (Goldmine)
fail to detect most of them.
VI. CONCLUSION
SoCs are widely used today in both embedded systems
and IoT devices. While SoC security is paramount, there
are limited prior efforts in defining and detecting a wide
variety of SoC security vulnerabilities. In this paper, we devel-
oped seven classes of SoC security vulnerabilities. Based on
these vulnerabilities, we proposed a framework for generating
security assertions. Using a diverse set of benchmarks, we
demonstrated that the functional assertions generated by state-
of-the-art assertion generation technique cannot eliminate the
need for our dedicated security assertions. Specifically, our
security assertions are able to detect all the implanted security
vulnerabilities while the state-of-the-art method failed to detect
most of them. We envision that the SoC designers will embed
security assertions in their designs in the near future as part
of their assertion-based security validation methodology. This
will open up several research directions in terms of how to
generate automated tests to activate these security assertions
as well as how to utilize these security assertions (properties)
for automated property checking.
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